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Nietzsche repeatedly claims that Zarathustra is his most important philosophical work (EH P 4; EH 
III Z 6; EH III Z 8).  He tells us that the core idea of Zarathustra is the eternal recurrence (EH III Z 
1; 8).  Moreover, he associates eternal recurrence with “the highest formula of affirmation that is at 
all attainable” (EH III Z 1; cf. BGE 56, EH II 10).  And he suggests that most of us will fail to 
attain this highest form of affirmation; most of us, when confronted with the thought of eternal 
recurrence, will either fail to appreciate the thought or will be plunged into despair (GS 341).  In 
short: Nietzsche thinks that his most important thought in his most important work is that most of 
us cannot truly affirm life.1   
  
That much is clear; unfortunately, much else is mysterious.  The idea of eternal recurrence is 
evocative but cryptic.  There are a number of scholarly controversies concerning how it should be 
interpreted and what problem it is intended to pose.  I think we can make progress on these matters 
by asking a very simple question: why is affirming eternal recurrence supposed to be more difficult 
than affirming a non-recurring, singular life?  Once we raise this question, a number of traditional 
interpretations of eternal recurrence begin to look problematic.   
 
Section 1 introduces the problem, arguing that an adequate interpretation of eternal recurrence will 
have to show why affirming recurring lives is more difficult than affirming singular lives.  Sections 2-
5 consider some influential interpretations of eternal recurrence, which attribute the difficulty of 
affirming eternal recurrence to the inescapability of suffering (Section 2), the interconnectedness of 
events (Section 3), the valuation of permanence (Section 4), and vengefulness (Section 5).  I argue 
that none of these interpretations can offer a good account of why affirming recurring lives would 
be more difficult than affirming singular lives.  In Section 6, I offer a new interpretation of eternal 
recurrence, which attributes its difficulty to the conditional nature of ordinary affirmation.  
Affirmation is conditional when it depends on the possibility of excising objectionable elements 
from the object of affirmation.  What Nietzsche means to reveal, with eternal recurrence, is that 
even the most apparently affirmative individuals often manifest only a conditional affirmation of life, 
a form of affirmation that conceals a tacit negation.  Eternal recurrence brings this hidden negation 
to light, thereby encouraging us to move toward an unconditionally affirmative stance.  In Section 7, 
                                               
1 Of course, this is coupled with a more positive thought: we can strive to become capable of affirming life.  GS 341 is 
sandwiched between GS 340, which discusses Socrates’ condemnation of life, and GS 342, which points us toward 
Zarathustra, who ultimately succeeds in affirming life.   
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I conclude by reflecting on why Nietzsche takes the distinction between conditional and 
unconditional affirmation to be such an important philosophical idea.  I argue that those who devote 
themselves to challenging, long-term goals will face psychological pressures that tend to deform 
unconditional affirmation into conditional affirmation.   
 
 
1.  The affirmation of life 
 
We can all think of things that might make life seem problematic.  Pervasive suffering; the collapse 
of traditional sources of meaning or direction; the entanglement of good events with bad ones; 
ennui; the perceived valuelessness of pursuits; the banality of many forms of modern life.  Or, to 
pick some non-Nietzschean candidates: injustice; the viciousness of human beings; unending 
conflict and war; environmental collapse; and one could go on and on.   
 
Suppose you’re worried about these things.  And suppose that you come to a view like this: although 
there’s plenty that’s bad about the world, you see a way of being positively disposed toward it.  You 
think life is worth living, despite these objectionable features.  Moreover, you don’t think this 
affirmative attitude rests on any false presuppositions or reflectively unstable beliefs.  You’ve 
thought carefully about life, you’ve cleared away illusions and false beliefs, and you’ve found a way 
of affirming life.  Your affirmation could be grounded in any number of ways: perhaps it’s mindful 
engagement with particulars; perhaps it’s having some great creative goal to which you’re devoted; 
perhaps it’s throwing yourself into political struggle; perhaps it’s love; perhaps it’s the quiet comforts 
of home.   
 
I want to emphasize that many people find themselves in this position.  Over the years, I’ve 
discussed Nietzsche’s ideas about affirmation with hundreds of students and dozens of 
philosophers, and by far the most common reaction that I’ve encountered is the belief that life is 
affirmable.  It’s rare to find anyone who thinks that life is perfect; but it’s equally rare to find those 
who explicitly and wholeheartedly reject life.  Most individuals take themselves to affirm life, though 
of course it’s unusual for them to put it this way until they’re introduced to the Nietzschean 
terminology.2   
 
It’s possible that these individuals are self-deceived, confused, or thoughtless.  It’s possible that if we 
cleared away these distortions and deceptions, these individuals would negate life.  Perhaps most of 
us are in that state: after all, Nietzsche emphasizes the opacity of the human mind, the mendacity of 
individuals, the pervasiveness of self-deception, the inability to understand our own motives and 
values.  In short: it’s possible that most or all cases of apparent life-affirmation would turn out to be 
illusory once we clear away these sorts of epistemic failings. 
 
But even if that were true, it wouldn’t by itself explain why the thought of eternal recurrence is 
supposed to render affirmation difficult.  To see this, let’s imagine one of these perfectly ordinary 
individuals, someone who takes herself to affirm life.  And let’s suppose that the person is 
                                               
2 And Nietzsche knows this.  First, consider his discussions of the last men: “‘we have invented happiness,’ say the last 
men, and they blink.” (Z Prologue 5).  The last men are content, albeit superficially so.  Second, Nietzsche defines the 
“omni-satisfied” as “those who consider everything good and this world the best… Always to bray Yea-Yuh—that only 
the ass has learned, and whoever is of his spirit” (Z III ‘Spirit of Gravity’).  Although both the last men and the omni-
satisfied are presented in disparaging ways, Nietzsche acknowledges that they take themselves to affirm life.   
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thoughtful, serious, and thorough in her reflections.  These are no obvious mistakes or omissions in 
her thought on these matters: she attends to all of the horrors of existence but nonetheless thinks 
that life is on balance affirmable, perhaps because she sees the bad in life as potentially correctible, 
or perhaps because she sees the good in life as potentially outweighing the bad.  Then you confront 
her with the thought of eternal recurrence.  You tell her: your life, as you’ve lived it, will repeat 
endlessly, with no details changed.  Everything will come back to you, again and again.  You will 
have no capacity to alter anything. 
 
How might the putatively affirmative individual respond?  Nietzsche expects a dramatic reaction:  
 
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke 
thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered 
him: “You are a god, and never have I heard anything more divine.” If this thought gained 
power over you, as you are it would transform and possibly crush you; the question in each 
and every thing, “Do you want this again and innumerable times again?” would lie on your 
actions as the heaviest weight! Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself 
and to life to long for nothing more fervently than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and 
seal? (GS 341) 
 
Nietzsche lists two possible reactions to the thought of recurring lives: despair, which he suggests is 
the most common reaction; and joy, which is rare.  Nietzsche thus suggests that someone who 
believes that she affirms life can find herself devastated by the thought of eternal recurrence.  Indeed, 
Nietzsche’s texts emphasize just this point: putatively affirmative individuals typically despair when 
confronted with eternal recurrence.  This is, after all, what happens to Zarathustra: he takes himself 
to be the teacher of how to reconcile oneself with existence, how to be well-disposed toward life (Z 
Prologue).  But then he is confronted with eternal recurrence and he is broken (Z III ‘Vision and 
Riddle’).  He is incapacitated; he cannot go on until he finds a way of reorienting himself in light of 
this thought (Z III ‘Convalescent’).  And a similar dynamic occurs in GS: from GS 125 onwards, 
Nietzsche repeatedly emphasizes that people who seem content with the death of God may be 
unaware of some deeper problem: the “shadows of god,” the lingering concepts, values, and 
orientations that permeate our lives but that presuppose a religious context.  And he urges us to 
become well-disposed toward life, discovering the malleability in our ways of experiencing events, 
striving for ever-more affirmative (and, perhaps, aestheticized) modes of experiencing life (see esp. 
GS 107, 276, 277, 290, 299, 301).  In GS 340, we’re told that the seemingly affirmative Socrates, who 
especially in Nietzsche’s time was taken as a sign of exuberant, affirmative life, had in fact tacitly 
rejected life.  And then in the next section we’re presented with eternal recurrence, prompting us to 
ask whether the same might be true of us: even if we think we are well disposed toward life, might 
we be incapable of affirming life in some deeper sense?  GS 342 then invites us to read Zarathustra.3  
 
If we keep this context in mind, we can see that Nietzsche intends eternal recurrence to present 
even the most apparently affirmative individuals with a problem.  Contemplating eternal recurrence 
is supposed to be more difficult than contemplating a singular life.  Someone who thinks that she is 
                                               
3 The final sentence of GS 341, especially when taken as leading into GS 342 and Z, suggests that someone who is 
traumatized by eternal recurrence might strive to change that fact, moving toward a fully affirmative reaction.  More on 
this below. 
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affirming life, that she is well-disposed toward it, could be traumatized by contemplating eternal 
recurrence.4 
  
Accordingly, Nietzsche must think that eternal recurrence presents some new, distinctive problem, a 
problem that either doesn’t arise or isn’t apparent when contemplating singular lives.  If we are to 
understand eternal recurrence, we’ll need to understand what this problem is.  I’ll treat this as a 
criterion of adequacy for interpretations of eternal recurrence: an acceptable interpretation of eternal 
recurrence must explain why it is more difficult to affirm recurring lives than singular lives.5,6 
 
 
2. Affirmation is difficult because life is full of suffering 
 
We want to know what might make it difficult to affirm recurring lives.7  Let’s start by considering 
the stance that Nietzsche opposes: pessimism.  We can define pessimism as the claim that the bad in 
life inevitably and invariably outweighs the good.  Schopenhauer argues for a particular version of 
pessimism, in which he both identifies goodness with the absence of suffering and argues that facts 
about the nature of willing guarantee that suffering is omnipresent and inescapable (Schopenhauer 
1844/1969: 319-363; see Reginster 2006 for a clear presentation of the view).  Although 
Schopenhauer inaugurates these debates, they continue beyond him: the clash between Pessimists 
and their opponents, the Optimists, is one of the dominant intellectual movements from the 1860s 
onward.  Sparked by Schopenhauer’s claims about the omnipresence and inescapability of suffering, 
                                               
4  Compare KSA 12:5[71], which suggests that eternal recurrence can be “the most extreme form of nihilism”; it can 
drive home the thought that existence is “without meaning or goal” and thereby deprive us of traditional forms of 
protection “from despair.”  
 
5 There are debates concerning whether eternal recurrence is supposed to be a cosmological hypothesis according to 
which our lives actually do recur (see Kaufmann 1950, Danto 1964, Loeb 2010, Abel 1998; for criticisms, see Nehamas 
1985, Simmel 1907, Soll 1973, Reginster 2006).  Fortunately, we can pass over these controversies here.  If Nietzsche 
thinks eternal recurrence is a true description of the universe, we can ask why knowledge that our lives repeat would 
make affirmation of life more difficult.  If he thinks eternal recurrence is merely a thought experiment, we can again ask 
why entertaining the hypothetical scenario would make affirmation of life more difficult.  (My own view: I think it’s clear 
that Nietzsche is attracted to the cosmological claim, but cannot find a satisfactory way of establishing it, and hence 
presents eternal recurrence in his published works merely as a hypothetical.) 
6 Remhof (2018) argues that part of what makes the affirmation of eternal recurrence difficult is its psychological setting: 
we are supposed to confront the thought of recurrence at the moment of our “loneliest loneliness” (GS 341).  Remhof 
suggests that facing recurrence “from a state of severe loneliness significantly amplifies the likelihood of eliciting a negative 
response” (2018: 196).  It may be true that at our most isolated and vulnerable moments, when we feel most detached 
from our social contexts and most pained by this detachment, we will tend to be less affirmative.  But I think that most 
of us, even at these dark moments, do not go so far as to condemn our actual lives.  So even if we accept Remhof’s 
claim, we would still need to know why affirming recurring lives is more difficult than affirming singular lives.   
7 An interpretive note: many commentators assume, often without argument, that what renders eternal recurrence 
difficult are facts about the agent’s own past.  I find it very strange that this assumption has gripped the literature (it is 
present most explicitly in Nehamas 1985 and Anderson 2005, but it is quite widespread).  In Z, Zarathustra evinces no 
concern whatsoever with his own past; what he finds troubling is more general features of his world, specifically the 
presence of the “small man” or the “rabble” (Z III ‘Convalescent’, Z III ‘Redemption’).  So, while it has become 
standard to present eternal recurrence as if Nietzsche wanted us to focus on our own pasts and our own choices, that 
assumption is not warranted by the texts.  To be sure, it’s possible that what would block some people from affirming 
eternal recurrence is the fact that they had a bad marriage or broke a leg or suffered a long illness; but that is not what 
concerns the character Zarathustra, so we’d do well to consider whether Nietzsche means to highlight some more 
general problem. 
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discussion continued through Eduard von Hartmann, Philipp Mainländer, Julius Bahnsen, David 
Freidrich Strauss, Eugen Dühring, and others.8 
 
It’s uncontroversial that Nietzsche is gripped by the Pessimism debates.  And there’s an obvious 
connection between the Pessimism debates and eternal recurrence: eternal recurrence, like the 
Pessimism debates, is concerned with whether an unprejudiced view of life leads us to despair.  This 
has led some readers to think that eternal recurrence is responsive to Schopenhauer’s concerns 
about suffering.9  But I think this is too quick.  Here’s why: if Nietzsche were merely concerned with 
Schopenhauer’s problem, then eternal recurrence would do no additional work.  If someone already 
accepts the idea that the pains of life necessarily outweigh the pleasures, then it’s hard to see why 
eternal recurrence would matter.  Schopenhauer, for example, thinks that even the prospect of living 
life once is sufficient to motivate pessimism, once we see what living actually involves.  So the person 
who accepts Schopenhauer’s arguments will already have the pessimistic reaction to life, 
independently of the eternal recurrence.   
 
And the reverse also seems true: if you’ve reconciled yourself to life despite the pervasiveness of 
suffering, then eternal recurrence shouldn’t bother you.  If suffering isn’t an objection to living once, 
it shouldn’t be an objection to living twice, five times, or an infinite number of times.  After all, 
while the total amount of suffering would be increased as lives are multiplied, the ratio of suffering 
to whatever one sees as redeeming suffering would remain constant.  Being content with a singular 
life despite suffering while rejecting a repeating life because of the very same suffering would be 
incoherent; it would be involve treating the very same thing in opposite ways depending exclusively 
on the number of times it occurs.10 
 
Of course, another form of pessimism is manifest in what Nietzsche likes to call “the wisdom of 
Silenus”: that the best thing is never to have been born, and the second best is to die soon (BT 3).  
It’s possible to read eternal recurrence as expressing the inescapability of life: the second-best 
option, that of dying soon, is not available, because your life will repeat eternally.  There is no escape 
from the cycle of death and rebirth, no escape from willing.  Perhaps eternal recurrence is supposed 
to target this thought.  But, aside from the fact that this is a fairly obvious point and thus hard to 
square with Nietzsche’s claims about the novelty of eternal recurrence, it doesn’t generate any 
additional problem for recurring lives.  Someone who is satisfied with a singular life is not going to 
be trying to escape from that life; someone who rejects a singular life already is.  So eternal 
recurrence, interpreted merely as claiming that we can’t escape from life, would be of limited import 
and limited originality.11    
 
Thus, we face a problem: this interpretation cannot fulfill the interpretive criterion.  The alleged fact 
that suffering outweighs happiness is no more of a problem for a repeating life than for a singular 
life.  Affirming eternal recurrence despite suffering should be no more difficult than affirming a 
singular life despite suffering.   
 
                                               
8 Beiser 2016 provides a helpful introduction to these figures.  For Nietzsche’s discussions of pessimism, see for example 
WS 184; D 354, 561; GS 48, 56, 134, 312, 313, 318, 326. 
9 Reginster 2006 makes a strong case for this point.  See also Janaway 2007. 
10 Soll 1973 also makes this point.  For an argument against it, see Loeb 2018.  
11 Compare Jenkins 2020: 30, who also emphasizes that this kind of thought is unoriginal and cannot be the content of 
eternal recurrence. 
 6 
3. Affirmation is difficult because everything is interconnected 
 
Let’s consider a more complex reading: Alexander Nehamas’ influential interpretation of eternal 
recurrence.  Notice that when eternal recurrence is discussed in Zarathustra, the interconnectedness 
of events is emphasized:  
 
Have you ever said Yes to a single joy?  O my friends, then you said Yes to all woe.  All 
things are entangled, ensnared, enamored; if you ever wanted one thing twice, if you ever 
said, ‘You please me, happiness!  Abide, moment!’ then you wanted all back.  All anew, all 
eternally, all entangled, ensnared, enamored – oh, then you loved the world.   (Z IV ‘Drunken 
Song’; see also Z III ‘Vision and Riddle’) 
 
And a similar point is made elsewhere: “nothing in existence may be subtracted, nothing is 
dispensable” (EH ‘BT’ 2).   
 
Drawing on passages on this type, Nehamas argues that Nietzsche rejects the distinction between 
accidental and essential properties.  Instead, he accepts a view that we can call (following Lanier 
Anderson) inverse superessentialism: every property is equally essential to who you are (Nehamas 
1985; Anderson 2005).  If this is right, then any change in a person’s life would result in a new 
person.   
 
Nehamas thinks that Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence presupposes this metaphysical thesis.  Nietzsche 
asks us to consider reliving just this life, with no detail changed, because reliving any other life 
wouldn’t count as reliving one’s own life.  As Nehamas puts it: “If my life were to recur, then it 
could recur only in identical fashion” (1985: 153). So, if we’re to affirm our lives, we have to affirm 
our lives with no details changed.  That’s the problem that eternal recurrence poses. 
 
I’m skeptical that Nietzsche actually endorses inverse superessentialism, but let’s set that aside.12  I 
want to focus on a simpler point: if Nietzsche were interested in the difficulty of affirming life given 
the interconnectedness of events, then eternal recurrence would be unnecessary.  Suppose Nehamas 
is correct in claiming that Nietzsche accepts inverse superessentialism.  And suppose I hesitate to 
affirm X (say, my life) because X is connected to Y (say, a past misfortune).  Whether X and Y 
repeat (and especially whether they repeat eternally) is irrelevant.  Any difficulties generated by 
Nehamas’ version of eternal recurrence are generated not by the idea of eternal repetition, but by 
inverse superessentialism.  The point about interconnectedness is doing all the work.  Eternal 
recurrence adds nothing. 
 
So we could imagine a demon appearing on the shoulder of some superficial optimist and saying: 
your life as you live it depends, for its particularities, on all the horrors of history, on the holocaust 
and on disease and massacre and war and death.  If you’re genuinely affirmative toward your life, 
you also have to affirm all of that.  Can you do it?13  No doubt this is a difficult question.  But it has 
                                               
12 Why be skeptical of this?  Simply put, the passages that suggest inverse superessentialism can be read more modestly: 
Nietzsche seems to me to be emphasizing that (1) events are interconnected in complex and unexpected ways, and that 
(2) in light of this certain ways of drawing the distinction between accidental and essential properties are untenable.  But 
you can endorse those points without committing yourself to the much stronger claim that (3) all distinctions between 
essential and accidental properties are equally arbitrary.   
13 This is, more or less, the question in Wallace 2013. 
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nothing to do with infinite or eternal repetition.  It does not help us to understand the question that 
eternal recurrence poses. 
 
So the interconnectedness of events doesn’t generate a special problem for recurring lives, as 
compared to singular lives.   It doesn’t make affirming repeating lives and more difficult than 
affirming a singular life. 
 
Consider the structure of this problem: on Nehamas’ interpretation, eternal recurrence turns out to 
be troubling only insofar as it reveals or dramatizes some problem that is completely independent of 
eternal recurrence.  This makes eternal recurrence itself superfluous; we could introduce the 
problem without mentioning eternal recurrence.  Below, I’m going to argue that the other familiar 
interpretations of eternal recurrence face the same problem. 
 
4. Affirmation is difficult because we crave permanence  
 
Bernard Reginster claims that eternal recurrence is difficult because accepting it “requires a 
revaluation of values” (Reginster 2006: 219).  In particular, it requires that change the way in which 
we evaluate ‘being’ and ‘becoming.’  Reginster argues that many philosophers have valued being or 
permanence over becoming.  He writes, 
 
In objecting to the aspiration for the eternal life, which is characteristic of Christianity but is 
also shared by a great many philosophers since Plato, Nietzsche is in fact objecting to their 
valuation of permanence, or “being,” and their corresponding devaluation of “becoming”: 
“Death, change, age, as well as procreation and growth, are for them objections—refutations 
even. What is, does not become; what becomes, is not . . . Now they all believe, even to the 
point of despair, in that which is” (TI, III 1; cf. GM, III 28). (Reginster 2006: 224) 
 
So Reginster’s claim is that many philosophers devalue ‘becoming’ and value ‘being’ or 
‘permanence’.  If we envision our lives eternally repeating, we envision a world in which nothing can 
be attained once and for all.  Any attained ends are undone; time repeats.  Permanence is impossible.  
Insofar as we continue to value permanence, eternal recurrence will therefore be troubling.  Insofar 
as we value becoming, eternal recurrence needn’t be troubling.  Eternal recurrence thus plays a role 
in revaluation: if we were committed to values that require permanence, we would need to shift to 
values compatible with transience.  So, as Reginster puts it, “to live in accordance with the eternal 
recurrence requires a revaluation of the condemnation of becoming” (Reginster 2006: 226). 
 
While Reginster’s claims are intriguing, this interpretation faces difficulties.  First, as Soll 1973 points 
out, the notion of eternal recurrence is compatible with a type of permanence—indeed, it is 
compatible with the only type of permanence most of us actually care about.  Let me illustrate this 
with an example.  Suppose a scientist is struggling to develop a vaccine to a dangerous disease.  She’s 
making progress and hopes to have a successful treatment in a few years, thereby savings thousands 
of lives.  But then you tell her: your attainment won’t be permanent; time will revert, the disease will 
recur.  Why should that matter?  It won’t change the fact that thousands will be saved during her 
actual lifetime.  I think this is the only form of permanence most of us desire: not permanence in the 
sense of unending, eternal stasis, but permanence in the sense of something’s lasting for a reasonable 
amount of time.  If you told the scientist that the world would be destroyed a day after her discovery 
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of the vaccine, then the pursuit of the vaccine would look senseless; if you told her the world would 
be destroyed a hundred years afterwards, its pursuit would be sensible.14 
 
Second, Reginster seems to me to underestimate the number of values that are compatible with the 
idea of becoming.  Reginster claims that “a paradigmatic manifestation” of the values that would be 
compatible with eternal recurrence is “creative activity” (2006: 226).  He argues that the creative 
individual continuously seeks to establish and then overcome particular goals, never merely abiding 
in her particular goals or states of accomplishment, and thus being committed to unending 
becoming (Reginster 2006: 226ff).  But is creative activity really so distinctive?  Here are some valued 
activities that don’t seem to depend on permanence: experiencing sensual pleasures, such as the 
pleasures of eating or having sex; listening to music; reading a novel; going for a nice walk; playing a 
game of basketball; going for a swim; taking a vacation; spending time with one’s family and friends.  
None of those seem to depend on permanence, and yet these are the very activities and goals that 
most of us see as infusing our lives with value.  And even if we focus on activities that more directly 
aim at some lasting accomplishment, it’s not clear that we typically care about the permanence of 
that accomplishment.  Picture the philosopher who spends years writing a book on some topic.  It 
would be laughable if the philosopher thought his book would be read for all eternity, or would have 
an effect that lasted for all eternity.  Most of us are perfectly content to have our writings read by a 
few contemporaries; we are under no illusions that we’ll attain more than that, and yet the activities 
still seem meaningful. 
 
In light of these points, let’s consider an individual who affirms his own singular life on the basis of 
these perfectly ordinary values.  Will such an individual be troubled by the thought of his 
attainments being undone?  It’s not at all clear to me that he would.  If he genuinely wanted 
permanence, eternal recurrence would be dispiriting; but I’ve suggested that most of us don’t want 
that kind of permanence.  Insofar as ordinary values seem sufficient to underwrite the affirmation of 
a singular life, no additional difficulties would be generated by thoughts of repeating lives.   
 
5. Affirmation is difficult because we are vengeful 
  
Let’s take stock.  So far, I’ve considered interpretations that attribute the difficult of affirming 
eternal recurrence to pessimism, interconnectedness, and the values of permanence.  Although these 
topics are among Nietzsche’s central concerns, I’ve argued that none of them would make the 
affirmation of repeating lives more difficult than the affirmation of singular lives.   
 
I now want to consider a different interpretation, which I think comes closer to the truth.  Put 
simply, this interpretation maintains that individuals whose values are reactive or vengeful will be more 
troubled by repeating lives than by singular lives.  So eternal recurrence diagnoses the reactive or 
vengeful structure of values, a structure which may not be apparent when contemplating one’s actual 
life. 
 
                                               
14 Relatedly, many of Nietzsche’s phrasings--a “great year” of becoming (Z III ‘Convalescent’), two “eternities” coming 
together at a gateway labeled “moment” (Z III ‘Spirit of Gravity’), two “long, eternal lane[s]” leading backward and 
forward (Z III ‘Spirit of Gravity’), and so on—suggest that we’re supposed to be envisioning time repeating in immense 
cycles.  If the idea is that every few billion years, history repeats, then the scientist could view her accomplishment as 
providing thousands of future generations with immunity to the disease.  It would be almost unintelligible to wish for 
more than that. 
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An interpretation of this form has been defended by Scott Jenkins.  Jenkins reads eternal recurrence 
as Nietzsche’s attempt to “think pessimism through to its depths” (BGE 56).  According to Jenkins, 
this means that Nietzsche wants to discover “the features of human psychology that either produce or 
dispose one to accept pessimistic worldviews” (Jenkins 2020: 24-25).  And Jenkins notes that 
“Nietzsche consistently identifies a single need lurking behind a pessimistic valuation of existence—
the need for revenge” (Jenkins 2020: 25).   
 
If this is right, then eternal recurrence must be connected to vengefulness (that is, the need for 
revenge).  But what, exactly, is the connection?  Jenkins claims that vengefulness “is an orientation 
within time, and in particular, toward the past.  Intuitively, a vengeful person is preoccupied or even 
obsessed with the past” (Jenkins 2020: 26).  Vengefulness is backward-looking: it concerns past 
harms, dwelling on them again and again (cf. Z II ‘Tarantulas’, Z II ‘Redemption’, and Z III 
‘Tablets’).    
 
Suppose a vengeful person tries to cultivate an affirmative attitude towards life.  In being vengeful, 
he will see some past harm as highly objectionable.  But, as we all know, there are ways of remaining 
affirmative despite this.  For example, we can see the future as compensating us for these past 
harms: yes, the past was bad, but the future is bright.  Imagine an individual of that form.  He sees 
life as affirmable because and to the extent that life compensates him for past harms.  Then we 
confront him with the thought of eternal recurrence.  He will need to experience those past harms 
again and again.  This could be traumatic, leading to despair.  A non-vengeful person, by contrast, 
needn’t in the same way be bothered by the thought of the past’s return. 
 
I think this reading comes close to the truth, but isn’t quite right.  Here is the key problem: it’s not 
true that “revenge is completely backwards-looking” (Jenkins 2020: 7).  Perhaps some people seek 
revenge in order to escape from, suppress, or compensate for past harms.  But others—indeed, the 
very people for whom the term ‘vengeful’ seems most accurate—are devoted to bringing about 
future harms to the offending object or person.  Vengefulness manifests as a desire to harm, to 
detract.  This needn’t be actualized; it can be mere fantasy (cf. GM I 10-11).  But it does generate an 
orientation toward an imagined future.  So Jenkins is right that the vengeful person broods, dwells, 
and in that sense orients himself toward the past; but he neglects the fact that just as essential is an 
orientation toward the future, in which the vengeful person seeks to retaliate against his object.  Max 
Scheler, in his analysis of Nietzschean ressentiment, offers what seems to me an accurate description 
of the vindictive or vengeful person: 
 
The vindictive person is instinctively and without a conscious act of volition drawn toward 
events which may give rise to vengefulness, or he tends to see injurious intentions in all 
kinds of perfectly innocent actions and remarks of others. Great touchiness is indeed 
frequently a symptom of a vengeful character. The vindictive person is always in search of 
objects, and in fact he attacks — in the belief that he is simply wreaking vengeance. This 
vengeance restores his damaged feeling of personal value, his injured “honor,” or it brings 
“satisfaction” for the wrongs he has endured. (Scheler 1994: 32) 
 
The vengeful person, so described, could welcome eternal recurrence.  After all, the repetition will 
bring ever more opportunities for harming and disparaging the rejected object.  Let’s call this 
diabolical vengefulness.15   
                                               
15 Thanks to Mark Migotti for suggesting the term diabolical.   
 10 
 
Diabolical vengefulness is a complex psychological state: one wants to damage or destroy the 
resented object, and in that sense wants to be rid of it; but one also needs the resented object, in 
order to react against it.  While this state is complex, I think it is perfectly ordinary.  As Nietzsche 
points out in the Genealogy and elsewhere, psychological complexes of this form are common, 
perhaps ubiquitous.  We are often attracted to that which we condemn: the ascetic priest seeks the 
very dominance that he consciously disparages; the sufferer thirsts after the very suffering that he 
wants to escape; “people no longer protested against pain, they thirsted after pain; “more pain! more 
pain!” thus cried the longing of his disciples and initiates for centuries” (GM III: 20).  In analogous 
fashion, the diabolically vengeful person wants both to destroy and to preserve the object of his 
vengeance: he needs an “opposite, external world” in order to express his vengeful values (GM I: 
10).  (Again, this can take the form of fantasy or imaginative reaction, as in GM I: 15’s discussion of 
the diabolical revenge fantasies of Tertullian and Aquinas.) 
 
Jenkins sees eternal recurrence as designed to distinguish the vengeful person from the life-affirmer.  
But if the diabolically vengeful person can crave eternal recurrence, then Jenkins can’t be right.  It 
can’t be vengefulness as such that’s at issue.  I want to suggest that the problem posed by recurrence 
is much simpler: whether one can bear the return of the detested object.  I’ll expand this point in the 
next section. 
 
6. What makes affirmation difficult is the desire to eliminate certain aspects of life 
 
Let’s take a step back.  Consider an individual who seems to affirm his actual life, but despairs when 
confronted with the thought of recurring lives.  Anyone who affirms life will have some basis for 
that affirmation, something in life that they take to render it affirmable.  This might be a value, an 
ideal, a goal.  For an individual with a vengeful ideal, we would have this structure:  
 
- I affirm life on the basis of A, 
- I value A because it negates B. 
- Eternal recurrence presents me with the prospect of B’s continual return.   
 
Let’s think about that third step.  Suppose I welcome the opportunity to negate, again and again, the 
rejected object B.  For example, suppose I’m a resentful priest in the Roman era who sees the 
collapse of archaic warrior morality.  My primary focus is on harming my enemy, the noble.  Insofar 
as I relish the harming of the noble, I could welcome the continuous return of the noble: after all, 
the continuous return of the resented object gives me something to damage, to destroy. 
 
This points to an ambiguity in the notion of revenge or reactivity.  We can distinguish: 
 
- The desire for revenge on X, which takes the form of desiring to harm X. 
 
- The desire to eliminate X, which takes the form of desiring that X not exist. 
 
The desire for revenge, so construed, is not problematized by eternal recurrence.  The person who 
desires revenge in this sense can welcome the prospect of eternal recurrence.  But the desire for 
elimination, construed in the second sense, is problematized by eternal recurrence.  Insofar as the 
rejected object’s existence is seen as intolerable, eternal recurrence will be intolerable; for it will 
entail that the rejected object cannot be eliminated.  It continuously returns.   
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Let’s now relate this to our original question.  What eternal recurrence seems to be revealing is not 
simple reactivity or vengefulness but something more profound: the inability to sustain affirmation 
of life so long as life contains certain features, events, or things.  With a singular life, one can 
envision the rejected object being eliminated once and for all.  With repeated lives, the rejected 
object keeps returning, is never truly gone.  So what’s being revealed is whether the person’s 
affirmation of life is conditional on life’s being purified of the rejected object.   
 
Let’s call this conditional affirmation, and define it as follows: 
 
Conditional affirmation: I affirm life on the condition that an aspect or feature of life can be 
eliminated. 
 
Unconditional affirmation: I affirm life just as it is. 
 
We can relate these notions to the plot of Zarathustra.  Consider.  Initially, Zarathustra wants to rid 
existence of the rabble.  He cannot bear that thought that life contains the rabble: “Life is a well of 
joy; but where the rabble drinks too, are wells are poisoned” (Z II ‘Rabble’).  He describes himself as 
“gagging” on the rabble: 
 
The bite on which I gagged the most is not the knowledge that life itself requires hostility 
and death and torture-crosses—but once I asked, and I was almost choked by the question: 
What? does life require even the rabble? Are poisoned wells required, and stinking fires and 
soiled dreams and maggots in the bread of life? (Z II “Rabble”) 
 
So how does Zarathustra manage to affirm life?  By isolating himself from the rabble: 
 
verily, I had to fly to the highest spheres that I might find the fount of pleasure again. Oh I 
found it, my brothers!  Here, in the highest spheres, the fount of pleasure wells up from me!  
And here is a life of which the rabble does not drink.   (Z II “Rabble”) 
 
He goes on to describe this as “a summer in the highest spheres with cold wells and blissful silence,” 
suggesting that it he is alone; and again “this is our height and our home: we live here too high and 
steep for all the unclean and their thirst” (Z II “Rabble”). So he avoids nausea by isolating himself 
from the nauseating object.  And he repeatedly returns to this theme: “the great disgust with man – 
this choked me and crawled into my throat” (Z III “Convalescent”).16 
 
Zarathustra affirms life by isolating himself from the rabble and fantasizing about a future in which 
the rabble has been eliminated; indeed, he admires those who “do not know how to live” without 
seeing themselves as a bridge to something future, in which the present has “gone under”, 
presumably never to return (Z Prologue).  And this carries him along well enough; he takes himself 
to be affirmative, to love life (Z Prologue).  But then he encounters the Soothsayer, who tells him 
that “All is empty, all is the same, all has been!” (Z II “Soothsayer”).  Nothing is fundamentally new; 
we just get more of the same, over and over.  And this leads into Zarathustra’s discussion of eternal 
recurrence, in which he envisions the continuous return of the rejected object.  He “chokes” on it, 
                                               
16 See Loeb 2010 Chapter 6 for more discussion of this passage.  For an insightful discussion of (what I am calling) 
unconditional affirmation, see Richardson 2020, Chapters 9 and 12.   
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chokes on his knowledge that the rabble will return (Z III “Convalescent”).  His initial affirmation 
of life is revealed to be conditional: he can affirm life only insofar as it is purged of the rabble.  
(Though I won’t argue for that here, I believe Part Three shows Zarathustra recognizing the 
conditionality of his affirmation and struggling to render it unconditional; he finally succeeds in Z III 
‘Seven Seals’.) 
 
Nietzsche makes analogous points about other approaches to life.  In Birth, for example, we’re told 
that the Dionysian stance involves affirming life conditional upon the purported recognition of a 
mystical primal unity (BT 3, BT 7-8); and that the Socratic stance portrays the pursuit of wisdom as 
redeeming life conditional upon its having the capacity to mitigate or even eliminate suffering, an 
assumption that Nietzsche presents Socrates himself as seeing through (BT 12-18).  In both cases, 
the affirmation is conditional: on the possibility of individuality being eliminated; on the possibility 
of suffering and unreason being removed.   
 
If we employ this distinction between conditional and unconditional affirmation, we can see why 
affirming a singular life would be easier than affirming a recurring life.  A singular life can be seen as 
purified of the objectionable elements.  Or, absent that, the purification can at least be seen as 
underway: one envisions a future in which the objectionable element has been eradicated.  A 
recurring life blocks this possibility.  The objectionable element will return, endlessly. 
 
Thus, if your affirmation of life is conditional, the thought of eternal recurrence will undermine this 
affirmation.  It will be more difficult to affirm eternal recurrence than to affirm a singular life: 
conditional affirmation is sufficient for affirming a singular life, but not recurring lives.   
 
Moreover, this can make the thought of eternal recurrence useful for diagnostic purposes.  Take 
someone who affirms singular life, and ask her if she can affirm eternal recurrence.  If she despairs, 
this is an indication that her affirmation was conditional.   
 
But, one might argue, doesn’t this require that we treat eternal recurrence as a true description of the 
universe?  Doesn’t it require us to assume that life actually recurs?17  After all, suppose I can only 
affirm life conditionally.  Then my affirmation of life is dependent upon the assumption that some 
feature—let’s say, dire poverty—can be eliminated.  And suppose further that it’s not true that the 
past recurs.  Then my affirmation of life is conditional, but this might seem unproblematic: I affirm 
the actual world, in which dire poverty can be eliminated once and for all; I just wouldn’t be able to 
affirm a different world, in which life and hence dire poverty recurred.  In short: conditional 
affirmation isn’t problematic if the condition can be met! 
 
But this objection misses its mark.  Contemplating a counterfactual scenario can reveal deficiencies 
in one’s relation to an actual scenario.  Consider an example.  Suppose I ask you whether your 
relationship with your partner would continue in the same fashion were your partner to suffer a 
debilitating illness, such as Alzheimer’s.  And suppose that in the actual world that will never be the 
                                               
17 Thanks to Paul Loeb for pressing me on this point.  Analogous points are raised by Karl Löwith (1997) and Bernd 
Magnus (1978), who worry that eternal recurrence can have an effect only if it is taken as a truth.  Magnus, for example, 
writes “What if I cease to believe in the truth of the hypothetical [concerning eternal recurrence]? … generally one ceases 
to behave as if X is true when one has good reasons to suspect that X is false” (Magnus 1978: 142).  Magnus ultimately 
argues that eternal recurrence has a primarily diagnostic role, revealing “what affirmation is and how far removed we are 
from it” (Magnus 1978: 156).  I agree with this, although I interpret the diagnosis differently.   
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case: you and your partner will enjoy good health to the end of your days.  Nonetheless, we can 
distinguish two people: one of whom says “of course!  I’d continue to love her, continue to relate to 
her in just the same way,” and another of whom says “I’m not sure.  I don’t think I’d be able to go 
on with her.”  Assuming that these statements are sincere and accurate, they pick out different ways 
of relating to one’s relationship: the former embodies a fuller, more complete form of commitment 
than the latter.  And this is true regardless of the fact that the counterfactual scenario will never 
occur.   
 
Just so with eternal recurrence: even if we stipulate that actual life does not recur, the way in which 
one relates to the prospect of life’s repetition can reveal provisionality, deficiency, or incompleteness 
in one’s relation to life.  In short: eternal recurrence can be false as a description of the actual world, 
and yet our reaction to it can still reveal crucial information about our relation to the actual world.  
 
With that in mind, let’s relate my interpretation of eternal recurrence to some of the previous 
interpretations.  Consider: Reginster is correct to think that eternal recurrence has something to do 
with permanence.  But the question is not whether our values presuppose permanence; few of them 
do.  The question is whether our affirmation of life is conditional on the possibility of eliminating 
detested features of life.  When we contemplate eternal recurrence, we see envision the detested 
object being a permanent, ineliminable feature of life.  But what generates the problem is not the 
temporality of the value or the detested object (i.e., whether it is transient or permanent); what 
generates the problem is the fact that the agent’s affirmation is conditional upon the possibility of 
eliminating the detested object.  So eternal recurrence doesn’t problematize the temporality of values 
but the logical structure of values. 
 
Jenkins is correct to think that eternal recurrence is connected to something like vengefulness or 
reactivity.  But this isn’t the full story, because some forms of vengefulness are compatible with 
eternal recurrence.  Indeed, vengefulness in its purest form would desire the return of the resented 
object, in order to negate it all the more.  What eternal recurrence brings to light is something more 
than vengefulness: the desire to purge existence of certain elements.  And what it reveals is not so 
much an orientation toward the past as a defective relation to the present.  Eternal recurrence is 
concerned neither with what has happened nor with what will happen but with what is happening.18 
 
7.  Conditional affirmation and higher values  
 
I want to close by tying some points together.  I’ve argued that the question of whether we affirm a 
singular life cannot easily distinguish between a case of conditional and unconditional affirmation, 
whereas contemplating recurring lives brings this distinction to the fore.  The function of eternal 
recurrence, then, is to diagnose the nature of one’s affirmation, revealing it to be either conditional 
or unconditional.  One potential worry about this interpretation is that it’s fairly simple: it doesn’t 
involve abstruse metaphysical theses about interconnectedness, profound revaluations of being and 
becoming, or complex analyses of temporality.  So why would Nietzsche think this distinction was 
so important?  Why present it as his most profound philosophical insight?  
                                               
18 To be clear, I don’t mean to suggest that Zarathustra is completely unconcerned with the past.  In ‘On Redemption’ 
and elsewhere, Nietzsche considers ways in which will to power and eternal recurrence might connect to certain ways of 
relating to the past.  I lack the space to address these points here.  Instead, I am making a more limited point: 
vengefulness is not simply an orientation toward the past (Sections 5-6); and Zarathustra is not simply concerned with 
events in his own past (Section 2).   
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To answer this question, we need to take a step back.  Recall that Nietzsche repeatedly claims that 
we can reconcile ourselves to existence only by accepting some evaluative framework that renders 
existence sensible.  As he puts it in the Gay Science, we need an interpretation that can “promote the 
life of the species, by promoting the faith in life. “Life is worth living,” every one of them shouts, 
“there is something to life, there is something behind life, beneath it; beware!”’ (GS 1).  This is the 
central theme in BT, GS, Z, and GM, and is also discussed in most of Nietzsche’s other texts.  The 
“Why?” must find some answer: “life ought to be loved, because—!” (GS 1).  Absent an answer to 
that question—absent a way of filling in the blank—we suffer: “[Man] did not know how to justify, 
explain, affirm himself: he suffered from the problem of his meaning” (GM III:28). 
 
What makes existence sensible, according to Nietzsche, is some religion, morality, ideal, or, more 
generally, some vision of human life (GS 1).  Just to have a neutral term to describe these things, 
let’s call them evaluative perspectives.  We’re given examples: Christianity; Renaissance humanism; 
Socratism; Greek tragedy; the Homeric warrior ethic; and Nietzsche’s will-to-power centered 
perspective.  In each of these, we have some vision of the good life, some vision of what makes life 
worth living.   
 
Some of these evaluative perspectives explicitly reject life, as in Schopenhauer or the Christian 
ascetic.  Others can seem more affirmative but are, Nietzsche thinks, in the process of collapsing: 
here he cites the Socratic perspective or the prioritization of truth (BT, GM III).  The evaluative 
perspective offered by Zarathustra initially seems different.  It is supposedly fully affirmative; 
Zarathustra loves life and will teach us how to do so as well (Z Prologue).  But problems with his 
ideals emerge.   
 
First, Zarathustra’s initial ideals have the same structure as the Christian and Socratic goals: they see 
the present as imperfect, as in need of redemption by some future goal.19  Man must be redeemed by 
the overman; a better world lies hidden beyond this one, if only we can serve as bridges to it (Z 
Prologue).  Zarathustra’s ideals thus deprecate the present by relating it to a putatively more valuable 
future: “The now and the past on earth – alas, my friends, that is what I find most unendurable; and 
I should not know how to live if I were not also a seer of that which must come” (Z II ‘On 
Redemption’).  So already there is a temptation to live for the sake of the future, to bear life in the 
hopes of changing it.  Although this doesn’t logically necessitate the condemnation of actual life, it 
does make it very tempting to think that actual life needs to be purified of objectionable elements in 
order to be affirmed. 
 
Second, and relatedly, Zarathustra’s ideals may be motivated—either at their outset or as they 
continue to manifest over time—by resentment or reactivity.  What’s primarily focused upon is 
getting rid of what’s actual, in favor of some putative and rather hazily described future.  This is why 
Zarathustra repeatedly “chokes” on his “great disgust with man” (Z III ‘Vision and Riddle’); it is 
why the Soothsayer, who says that there is never anything new and there can be no escape from the 
past, terrifies Zarathustra (Z II ‘Soothsayer’); it is why Zarathustra attempts to suppress the past, 
keeping it encased behind irons gates and glass coffins (Z II ‘Soothsayer’).  Regardless of how 
Zarathustra’s ideas originate—and if Zarathustra is right they originate out of an active, joyous, 
creative ‘yes-saying’—the focus, as these goals are lived, is increasingly on what’s rejected, rather 
than what’s sought.   
                                               
19 See Clark (1990: 273-277) and Anderson 2009. 
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What would be best, by Nietzsche’s lights, is to have some evaluative perspective that placed full 
value in the present, allowing it to be affirmed unconditionally.20  But this introduces a new problem.  
Let me explain. 
 
At the beginning of this essay, I noted that an ordinary person devoted to ordinary goals, a person 
who contents himself with everyday life, needn’t have much trouble with eternal recurrence: most of 
us will find that mundane pursuits infuse our lives with enough value to make our lives worth 
affirming.  I think Nietzsche is aware of this.  His “last men” are those who embrace simple 
pleasures and ordinary pursuits, who are indeed incapable even of understanding why one would 
pursue great, difficult, challenging goals.  They lack any ideals that might inspire devotion, 
commitment, achievement.  Any ideal that requires “exertion” is derided: pursuing such ideals is 
madness, and the last man tells us that “formerly all the world was mad” (Z Prologue 5). 
 
The last men would view the eternal recurrence in the same way they view everything else: as a mild 
diversion that provokes no great troubles.  And, as I pointed out in Section 1, this is just the reaction 
that eternal recurrence tends to provoke in our contemporaries.  But suppose we focus not on the 
last men but on those striving for something more.  Elsewhere, I’ve argued that the distinguishing 
feature of the last men is that their evaluative perspective lacks higher values.  A large part of what 
disgusts Zarathustra about the last men and the rabble is the absence of higher values.21  Higher 
values are overriding, incontestable, and resistant to critical scrutiny.  In addition, they confer a sense 
of meaning or significance on the activities that they regulate.22  Socrates’ higher value is something 
like understanding or truth; Zarathustra’s is, at the outset, the overman.  In each case there is a 
difficult goal to be striven for, something that can confer meaning on the activities it regulates.  So in 
both GS and Z we have individuals who espouse higher values and are beginning to recognize ways 
in which they are problematic.   
 
Suppose eternal recurrence is meant to address those whose evaluative perspectives include higher 
values.  People with higher values differ from the last men in that they see striving for great tasks as 
worthwhile, meaningful, or meritorious.  They embrace goals that mandate devotion, compliance, 
and sacrifice of competing goods.  They endorse the values of achievement and growth, the values 
that Nietzsche associates with the manifestation of will to power (see Katsafanas 2013). 
 
When confronted with eternal recurrence, those with higher values face a deep and difficult 
problem.  Can we be unconditionally affirmative while still harboring higher values?  This is very 
hard.  The focus on some valued goal that is not yet attained tends to lead us into a devaluation of 
the present, as we see in Zarathustra: because the value of the present activities is seen as lying in 
some future state, the present tends to be experienced as deficient relative to the imagined future.  If 
the attainment of the future goal is the source of the present’s value, then the value of the present 
seems to seep into the future; the present is denuded, and life is lived for the sake of the conjectural 
future.  Schopenhauer makes this point in a lovely passage: 
                                               
20 Compare Richardson 2020, Chapter 9. 
21 “‘What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?’ thus asks the last man, and he blinks” (Z Prologue 
5; cf. Z Prologue 3).  The descriptions of the last men consistently emphasize their inability to understand the pursuit of 
great, challenging goals, the very sorts of goals that higher values underwrite.  See Katsafanas 2015 for a discussion of 
this point.  Relevant passages include GS 1, BGE 263, Z Prologue, KSA 12:1[22], KSA 12:10[95], and KSA 13:11[100]. 
22 See Katsafanas 2015 for a defense of these interpretive claims.   
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We look upon the present as something to be put up with while it lasts, and serving only as 
the way towards our goal. Hence most people, if they glance back when they come to the 
end of life, will find that all along they have been living ad interim: they will be surprised to 
find that the very thing they disregarded and let slip by unenjoyed, was just the life in the 
expectation of which they passed all their time. (Schopenhauer, Parerga und Paralipomena 
Section 145, T. Bailey Saunders translation) 
 
Schopenhauer is not making a point about the contents of particular values or goals; he is not 
claiming that some pursuits lead us to a devaluation of the present, whereas others might not.  He is 
making a deeper and perfectly general point: that the very having of a goal etiolates the present, 
drawing our attention to the future; and more so, to the extent that the goal is invested with great 
import.  Our orientation toward goals displaces our interest into the future; we lose life as it is lived, in 
favor of an imagined future, so that the present is experientially barren and evaluatively deficient.  
And the greater the distance between the ideal and the actual, the greater the danger that this will 
occur.  That is why higher values pose such a challenge.   
 
Something like this, I suggest, worries Nietzsche.  He doesn’t follow Schopenhauer in thinking that 
the process described above is inevitable or inescapable (much of Nietzsche’s work is designed to 
provide an alternative account of the relation between valuing, willing, and temporality).23  But he 
does agree with Schopenhauer that it is a real danger.  Indeed, we can see the tension embodied in 
Nietzsche’s own life.  Nietzsche wants to be “only a yes-sayer” (GS 276), and yet anyone who reads 
his polemics and critiques can see how tenuous his grip on that aspiration is.  The danger is not just 
that his higher values will turn out to be reactive: the danger is that even values which start out as 
fully affirmative, fully active, can be deformed into their opposites.24  This movement is on display in 
Zarathustra.  I think Zarathustra has the familiar structure of a Bildungsroman, with the early parts 
showing Zarathustra succumbing to various misunderstandings and errors, the middle parts 
portraying Zarathustra’s realization that his putatively affirmative ideals are expressions of reactive 
stances, and the later parts showing him restructuring his task in order to overcome these mistakes.25  
                                               
23 See in particular his reflections on will to power, discussed in Katsafanas 2013.  Put simply, Nietzsche thinks that 
rather than adopting means for the sake of ends, we sometimes adopt ends for the sake of the challenges that their 
means afford. 
24 And, conversely, condemnatory ideals can be transformed into affirmative ones.  It is also worth noting that these are 
extremes.  In addition to ideals being transformed into their opposites, there will be cases in which ideals come to be 
mixed or contaminated with contrary elements: an ideal that is originally purely affirmative will come to incorporate 
reactive or condemnatory elements, without sliding all the way into total negation.  See BGE 224, which emphasizes that 
most ideals in the modern world are of this mixed type. 
25 In particular, note that in BGE Nietzsche claims that his noble or higher individual needs the rabble.  The higher 
individual requires a form of social hierarchy; in order for this hierarchy to exist, some people need to be at the bottom 
(BGE 257-260).  So, in endorsing a form of hierarchy and the establishment of a “pathos of distance,” Nietzsche cannot 
endorse the elimination of the rabble.  Arguably this points to a difference between Nietzsche’s ideals and the ideals that 
Zarathustra originally endorses: whereas Nietzsche wills even the existence of the rabble, Zarathustra, in preaching the 
overman, originally falls short of this.  So Zarathustra must overcome his own disgust at the rabble, his own reactive 
attitudes, in part by coming to see the rabble as a necessary constituent of the ideal that he affirms.  And, although I lack 
the space to develop this point, this relates to the role of the overman concept in Z.  Some commentators argue that the 
notion of the overman is progressively abandoned as Z unfolds (e.g. Lampert 1986); others disagree, thinking that 
Zarathustra maintains his commitment to that notion (e.g. Loeb 2010).  I think Ansell-Pearson (1992) is right to 
distinguish two different ways in which the overman can be understood: the overman as a fundamentally new, 
redemptive, transfigured humanity (which I take Zarathustra to endorse early in Z and reject later in Z) and the overman 
as an image of the person who bears an unconditionally affirmative attitude toward life (which is the picture that 
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But regardless of whether this is true of Zarathustra, it’s clear that Nietzsche is interested, throughout 
his career, in teasing out the underlying structure of ideals, showing that apparently condemnatory 
ideals also express an attachment to life (GM III) or that apparently affirmative ideals also express a 
condemnation of life (GS 340, GM III).  For Nietzsche is not only interested in the content of our 
ideals.  He is also interested—arguably more interested—in what sustains our commitment to those 
ideals.  What the eternal recurrence can reveal, and what the contemplation of a singular life 
occludes, is the deformation of an affirmative ideal into its opposite.  Or, perhaps put in terms of a 
problem: it can suggest that any attempt to manifest an unconditionally affirmative ideal will be 
beset by tensions, perennially tempting the adherent to negate what is actual in favor of what is ideal; 
and the more so, to the extent that the ideal takes the form of a higher value.  The question, for 
Nietzsche, is whether we can cleave to an ideal while simultaneously affirming a world in which that 









                                               
emerges in Z III).  In short: Zarathustra abandons one notion of the overman and replaces it with another.  (I thank 
Tsarina Doyle and Keith Ansell-Pearson for asking me to address these points.)  
26 Reginster (2006) points out that Nietzsche associates one form of nihilism with the commitment to unrealizable ideals.  
We should be careful to distinguish unrealizability in Reginster’s sense from the type of commitment I’m discussing 
above.  Certain ideals are unrealizable because they have false presuppositions.  For example, Nietzsche takes 
otherworldly ideals to be unrealizable, for the simple reason that there’s no sense to be given to the notion of the 
otherworldly.  Eternal recurrence, as I’m interpreting it, doesn’t focus on that kind of unrealizability.  It instead confronts 
us with the thought that any goal, even if it is realized, will be undone.  Nothing is realizable once and for all.  But this is 
different from nothing being realizable at all.  So the type of unrealizability with which eternal recurrence confronts us is 
not the same as the type of unrealizability that Nietzsche associates with nihilism.  
27 For helpful comments on this paper, thanks to Keith Ansell-Pearson, Paul Loeb, Kaitlyn Creasy, Justin Remhof, 
Allison Merrick, Alexander Prescott-Couch, Mark Migotti, Tsarina Doyle, Andrew Huddleston, Rebecca Bamford, Ian 
Dunkle, Matthew Meyer, Richard Elliott, and the participants at the session on “Nietzsche, Nihilism, and Life-
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